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MUSICAL DE-COMPOSITION 
Arnold Berleant 
  
Let me begin by disclaiming any intention of implying, as  
the title of this essay may suggest, the same prognosis for music  
that Baudelaire made for love when, in "La Charogne," he likened  
the future of his beloved to a dog's decaying carcass.  It is  
true, however, that what I have to say about music will perhaps  
appear quite as shocking to the traditional lore of aesthetics as  
the poet's song did to that of love.  But it is my intention to  
carry the comparison no further and to offer, not a romantic  
apostasy of love but what might rather be regarded as a romantic  
affirmation of art.  In any event, my interest here is not in  
biological degeneration but in artistic generation, and I hope to  
suggest that in the case of music and, (mutatis mutandis), the  
other arts, some common ways of regarding the creative process  
are as misleading as they are misapprehended.  More positively, I  
shall offer an alternative that may grasp more successfully  
something of the nature of the creative factor in musical  
composition.      
  
That process is one which often baffles the non-musician,  
probably because the materials of music and the ways they are  
shaped seem markedly different from those found in the other  
arts.  Moreover, they appear to have little direct connection  
with those regions of experience that lie outside that art and  
with which we are familiar and easy.  And so the challenge of  
arranging such materials is incomprehensibly strange.  Perhaps  
that is why in the western classical tradition music is so often  
called the most abstract of the arts, for it rarely draws  
directly from the sounds of nature nor does it usually assume the  
fragmentary forms in which they appear.  Even when music is  
combined with theater as in opera, with poetry as in song, with  
rhetoric as in melodeclamation, or with environment as in  
musique concrete, it does not seem to possess in any direct  
fashion the referential character that language has in  
literature, or the images and forms of the world around that  
painting and sculpture have until recent times exhibited directly  
and even in their most abstract moments still retain.  Music does  
not fashion itself out of the social condition of human action  
and reflection in the manner of narrative literature, nor can it  
grasp the steadying hand of mechanics and function that are an  
inherent part of architecture and to which Goethe and  
Schopenhauer once compared it.@foot[Arthur Schopenhauer, (The  
World As Will and Representation), trans. by E.F.J. Payne (The  
Falcon's Wing Press, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 453-454.]  It is true  
that theorists have claimed at times that music reflects or  
embodies the qualities and dynamic forms of emotional states.   
This notion can be traced back to the Classical period, it  
appeared in certain theories during the sixteenth and seventeenth  
centuries, emerged as a position in its own right in the  
(Affektenlehre) of the eighteenth century Germans, and still  
continues beyond Langer's theory of the arts as symbolic of  
feeling in the twentieth.  Yet this is a connection that requires  
a developed theory for it to be taken seriously, and such  
proposals have by no means been universally accepted.  Apart from  
the commonplace association of music with feelings (a connection  
that results in rather little intelligibility by balancing the  
intangibility of the one by the chaos of the other), music  
remains perhaps the most arcane of the major arts, an intriguing  
yet incomprehensible wonder of creation.  Indeed, there is surely  
a point to be found in Schoenberg's remark that "from the point  
of view of pure aesthetics, music does not express the  
extra-musical."@foot[Quoted by Francis Sparshott, "Aesthetics of  
Music--Limits and Grounds," f.n. 30.]  This, then, is the  
peculiar travail and glory of the composer.  By inventing and  
ordering sounds which have no direct tie outside that art and  
which serve no primary purpose, he becomes a Promethean  
challenger of the divine monopoly on original creation.   
Apparently beginning with no more than a self-contained history  
of techniques and practices, the composer brings something into  
being where there was nothing before.  
  
Yet at the same time that music is abstract and  
intangible, it is also concrete, utilizing the most direct  
qualities of audible experience.  What these qualities are has  
often been specified by such terms as tone, pitch, timbre,  
duration, intensity, volume, rhythm, meter, tempo, and the like.   
Joined together in a musical work, these immediately perceptible  
qualities make music directly accessible.  There need be no  
intermediary for perceptual experiences which we can apprehend in  
their striking directness and whose force requires no explanation  
(although it often tempts one).  In the arranging of these aural  
qualities lie the confusions and challenges of musical  
composition, and much has been proposed and denied about this  
process.  Some have tried to characterize the outcome of such an  
ordering in the most general terms.  Hanslick's specification is  
the classic statement of the formalist position--(tonend  
bewegte Formen), which may be translated variously as "sound and  
motion,"@foot[(The Beautiful in Music), trans. Gustav Cohen,  
ed. Morris Weitz (New York, 1957)] "forms moving in terms of a  
tonal system,"@foot[Francis Sparshott, @UN(op. cit.), p. 45.] and  
"tonally moving forms,"@foot[Professor Geoffrey Payzant, in a  
new, important, not yet published translation of the Hanslick  
book.], but which I should prefer to read, closest to the last of  
these and least assumptively as "forms of moving tones."  This is  
a position which has clear echoes in Stravinsky's observation  
that "the phenomenon of music is the phenomenon of speculation  
aimed at the elements of sound and time"@foot[Igor Stravinsky,  
(Poetics of Music) (New York:  Vintage, 1956), p.28.] and  
Langer's claim that the essence of music is "the creation of  
virtual time, and its complete determination by the movement of  
audible forms."@foot[Suzanne Langer, (Feeling and Form) (New  
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p.125.]  Yet these highly  
generalized characterizations, while commendable for being  
literal and direct, seem to help us rather little in accounting  
for the ways in which music is shaped from these basic materials  
into individual works.  
  
Now specific systems of rules are sometimes adduced here,  
the most famous of which is surely Schoenberg's twelve-tone  
serial technique.  Yet except in its most attenuated and  
cabalistic post-Webernian manifestations, a tone row specifies an  
order roughly comparable to a mode or a scale, except that the  
sequence in using the pitches is obligatory.  This leaves an  
enormous range of flexibility to the composer's individual  
discretion, resulting in music as varied stylistically as  
Schoenberg's (Violin Concerto), Berg's (Lulu), and  
Webern's, (Symphony) op. 21, to cite some of the most famous.   
Rules have often been adduced for the writing of music, from  
Johann Joseph Fux's codification of contrapuntal practice and  
Rameau's ordering of the tertiary harmonic idiom, both early in  
the eighteenth century, to Goetschius's neat ordering of  
homophonic and contrapuntal musical forms at the turn of the  
twentieth and to periodic attempts to specify rules for writing  
four-part harmony.  Yet except for serial composition, such  
systems of rules have most typically followed practice, not  
prescribed it, and have led to enshrining uninteresting  
conventions once the practices they specify are no longer fresh  
and unpredictable.  Apart from the skill and auditory awareness  
that may be acquired by mastering an already petrified technique,  
rules have little to offer either as a method or an explanation  
of musical composition.  
  
There is another even more common account whose  
simplicity and obviousness are compelling to the amateur and  
musician alike.  It is, indeed, stereotypical to regard musical  
composition as a process of shaping tonal materials by the  
demands of one musical form or another.  Not only does a  
preponderance of the musical literature, classical, folk, or  
popular, follow an easily identifiable form; those forms supply  
the names for much of that literature.  Songs, ballads, fugues,  
canons, sonatas, symphonies, rondos, variations offer titles and  
explanations of music simultaneously.  It is easy and clear to  
consider a musical form much in the manner of a mold that gives  
shape to its contents.  Musical sounds are arranged within the  
restrictions imposed by a form, and the form provides guidance to  
the composer for the elaboration and ordering of his materials.   
Such forms are a rough analogue of the Kantian categories of the  
understanding, functioning as (a priori) determinants of  
chaotic tonal matter which, without such ordering, would be both  
shapeless and incomprehensible.  Even if one wisely acknowledges  
those arguments for literature and painting that advise against  
thinking we can separate form and matter, the distinction is  
convenient and compellingly obvious in the case of music, and it  
appears to offer the most plausible account of the compositional  
process.  Indeed, the very word 'compose' means, by etymology and  
usage, 'to place together,' and suggests a constructivist  
activity.  Thus usage, convention, and intuition concur.  
  
As an account of how composers compose, the process of  
shaping musical materials according to the patterns and  
strictures of a previously determined form is no doubt true in  
many cases.  Production by formula has, to be sure, a long and  
tiresome history for the listener as well as for the composer  
with limited originality.  Even though we are ready to admire  
Bach for those marvelous dissonances which stand as exceptions to  
the conventions of voice-leading that were codified only after  
his time and we extoll Beethoven and Mahler for their daring in  
bursting the confines of the classical symphony, it is still true  
that there is a vast literature that seems more or less to conform  
to those established patterns.    
  
Still there are problems.  For example, musical forms are  
not neutral structures that can be filled by any material at  
hand.  You cannot have a Dutch colonial skyscraper, Philip  
Johnson and post-modernism notwithstanding, just as you cannot  
have a monumental classical symphony.  When Mozart approached  
this in the finale of his (Jupiter Symphony), for instance,  
he had to break the bonds of the sonata-allegro form and adapt it  
to his own purposes, just as Beethoven did for the same reasons  
in the first movement of the (Eroica).  There cannot be a  
monochromatic still life or an epic sonnet for the same reason  
that the subject of a Bach fugue cannot serve as the theme of a  
symphony or a three-part song.  That is because musical materials  
place demands on the composer; they require certain forms of  
elaboration and reject others.  And when a composer is more  
swayed by the force of convention than by the force of his  
musical ideas, the result shows the strain, as when Schubert bent  
his extraordinary genius for lyric melody into awkward and ungainly  
dimensions under the expansive and developmental requirements of  
the symphony.  To be able to function in a different, uncongenial form,  
musical ideas must be modified to change their character, as when the  
theme in a sonata-allegro movement is used as the subject of a  
fugato. At the very least, then, there is a correlative relation  
between musical materials and forms:  the materials suggest what  
form is most suitable and the form suggests the type of material  
appropriate to it.  But this is an uneasy balance, probably  
because the terms of the equation are the wrong ones and, indeed,  
because there is no equation in the first place.  
  
For there is more to be answered here than this  
convenient falsehood can manage.  The forms we have been talking  
about do not appear ready made: they have their histories.  Different  
materials appear and an altered sensibility develops.  Over the  
course of music history there have been changes in melodic  
style, altered and expanded harmonic structures, and fresh  
sounds, textures, and patterns generated by the technical  
capabilities of newly invented instruments like the piano and the  
synthesizer.  These novel materials force the development and  
extension of the prevailing forms, such as the expansion of the  
Baroque binary form into the sonata-allegro form and the  
classical symphony into the romantic one.  Isn't it more  
plausible to suppose, then, that the kinds of thematic, textural,  
and harmonic materials of a period influence and indeed shape the  
prevailing forms of that period?  At the very least, composers of  
talent instill freshness and life into the conventions they  
inherit, as Bach, Brahms, and Stravinsky did.  Often they develop  
and extend those conventions, as was the case with Haydn and Mozart,  
stretch them into unrecognizability, as happened with Bruckner, Mahler, and  
Wagner, and seize on new vehicles to carry their distinctive  
ideas forward, as did Chopin, Liszt, and Satie.  Such composers  
can hardly be said to "follow the form" when their materials just  
will not abide by the strictures of those forms.  
  
However we structure the problem of the relation between  
musical form and materials and attempt to resolve it by  
attenuating the distinction and urging the reciprocity of its  
terms, the issue will not settle comfortably.  For the phenomena  
of music, complex though they be, are not packaged that way, so  
far as perception is concerned.  The distinction between form and  
materials in music comes after the fact, not before it. It is an  
ordering by which we hope (mistakenly) to understand those  
phenomena better.  Yet it is hard to avoid the thought that this  
may be yet another case of the common philosophical occurrence of  
concepts and distinctions that generate more difficulties than  
they dispel.  Sparshott comes to similar conclusions in  
discussing the separation between making and listening to  
music,@foot("Aesthetics of Music," pp. 24-25, ms. version.) yet  
he incurs the same difficulties with his categorization of three  
different kinds of music:  melodic, rhythmic, and cerebral, as if  
these were not necessary parts of virtually every musical  
work.@foot([Ibid]. pp. 30-31, 40, ms. version.)  When it is  
the composer who leans on the form-materials distinction and  
guides his musical ideas by the demands of a form, there emerges  
all the tediousness of derivative art, of pat formulas with  
predictable products.  While new materials and technologies are a  
major cause in changing musical sensibilities which then press in  
fresh directions for their embodiment, they offer but the most  
obvious case of what all art compels.  In music as in the other  
arts, the work is not a construction from elements but an  
indissoluble unity.     
  
How better can we develop an aesthetics of musical  
composition from the standpoint of perceptual experience?  If we  
are sensitive to musical sounds as they are directly heard, we  
may discover that they possess a dynamic, generative  
character.@foot[Zuckerkandl and Schenker have explored certain  
aspects of these traits of musical tones and motives.  (Cf.)  
Victor Zukerkandl, {Sound and Symbol} (Princeton:  Princeton  
University Press, 1956); Heinrich Schenker, {Free  
Composition,} trans. Ernst Oster (New York:  Longman, 1979).]  A  
tone, for example, will not stand alone; its very duration  
extends the tone and projects a tension that propels it forward.   
Accretions and groupings develop, and each of these contains its  
own aural impulses that compel it to move ahead.  From the  
opening motive of Beethoven's (Fifth Symphony) to the  
five-note figure that begins Bartok's (Music for Strings,  
Percussion, and Celeste), the history of music is replete with  
works that develop out of the forces implicit in their motivic  
ideas.  
  
Yet there are many other ways in which musical forces  
move.  Patterns of tones, of rhythm, or of harmony, for example,  
may set up a momentum which must be continued and carried to  
fulfillment.  Many of the (Preludes) from Bach's  
(Well-Tempered Clavier) are generated from patterns of harmony  
and of keyboard texture, uniform figures that constitute nearly  
the entire piece.  Zuckerkandl's discussion of the dynamic  
properties of tones in the diatonic system does much to  
illuminate how connections among pitches are not fortuitous but  
are generated out of the forces and tensions inherent in the  
relationships among such sounds.  Melodies have a kind of logic  
in their fulfillment, although words like logic or necessity have  
connotations too rational to convey the dynamic qualities of  
sound that the composer grasps intuitively.  A work like Ravel's  
(Bolero) combines both a persistent rhythmic pattern with two  
similar melodies repeated endlessly, all cast under the dynamic  
framework of a single great crescendo to fashion an obsessively  
powerful work.  
  
Repetition, in fact, may be the single most significant  
factor in the development of musical materials.  It is important,  
however, not to construe repetition in a mechanical sense, for  
music is not built up out of repeated units as a building may be  
constructed out of blocks of brick or stone or as an engine fires  
its cylinders ceaselessly in an unvarying order.  Repeated  
melodic, rhythmic, or harmonic patterns breed their sequels, so  
to speak, for the ways in which continuity develops are not only  
cumulative but generative.  The chaconne and the passacaglia are  
instructive examples of how this may occur.  Used mainly in the  
Baroque period, these are two related modes of composition that  
shape a piece out of a single repeated unit.  Although there is some  
disagreement about the exact distinction between them  
historically, there is reason to associate the chaconne with a  
repeated harmonic sequence and the passacaglia with a repeated  
ostinato or ground--a line that appears mainly but not always in  
the bass.  Out of a germinal unit that is usually made up of a  
set of four or eight bars in slow triple meter, a series of  
continuous variations unfolds, carried along by their own  
momentum to sometimes dramatic conclusions, as in Bach's  
(Partita No. 1) for unaccompanied violin and the finale of Brahms'  
(Fourth Symphony).@foot[(Cf.) Willi Apel, (Harvard  
Dictionary of Music) (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press,  
1953), pp. 126-129.]  A different use of a repeated musical unit  
forms the basis of Schoenberg's serial technique.  This utilizes  
a structural unit called a row, usually made up of the twelve  
semi-tones within an octave, arranged by the composer in a  
different and distinctive order for each particular musical work,  
and repeated in the same order but with varying rhythm, range,  
harmonic, and melodic appearances.   
  
Repetition assumes many different forms in music.   At  
times repetition may be of a single note (for example, of the  
first thirteen melodic notes of Chopin's (Etude) op. 25 no. 1,  
ten of them are the same e flat) or it may be of a simple  
interval (as in the prevalence of the minor second in Beethoven's  
(Quartets) op. 95 and op. 132 and the fifths and fourths at  
the opening of his [Ninth Symphony]).  Fugal subjects  
characteristically are repeated in their entirety and any changes  
that are made are carefully limited so as not to affect their  
integrity and recognizability.  Moreover, the literal repetition  
of entire large sections of sonata-allegro movements of sonatas  
and symphonies was common practice well into the nineteenth  
century.  If understood as a recommendation for experience and  
not as a notational convention and if it is performed  
accordingly, repetition is no mere blind duplication but a new  
and different experience in its own right. Repetition then  
becomes regeneration rather than reiteration.  One is reminded of  
William James's comment that "no state once gone can recur and be  
identical with what it was before....Does not the same piano-key,  
struck with the same force, make us hear in the same way?...It  
seems a piece of metaphysical sophistry to suggest that we do  
not; and yet a close attention to the matter shows that there is  
no proof that the same bodily sensation is ever got by us  
twice."@foot[From (The Principles of Psychology), reprinted in  
(William James:  The Essential Writings), ed. B. Wilshire,  
(New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 47.]     
  
Since the forces and tensions inherent in musical sound occur in  
elusive ways, one can think of the composer as an artist who  
possesses a special sensitivity to the dynamic pressures of sound.   
All musical materials have distinctive traits and thus generate  
their own individual ways of being developed.  And because these  
sounds and their germinal shapes are always different, there are  
no formulas for realizing their possibilities in ways that carry  
richness and wonder, especially under repeated listening.  Every  
work, then, is newly made, not by a process of building up, but  
by a process of germination and growth.  One thinks here of such  
striking examples as the tone poems of Liszt, in which motives  
emerge and develop, the music dramas of Wagner, with their  
ceaseless interweaving of leitmotifs, and even a work like  
Sibelius' (Fourth Symphony), whose themes appear as the  
culmination of the movements rather than at the outset.  But what  
is most pronounced in these cases is but the manifestation of the  
pervasive and central trait of musical creation.  Musical  
de-composition means, then, that making music is not an act of  
combination but a process of producing sound sequences and  
structures by drawing out the generative possibilities of the  
musical materials.  Writing music is an expansive activity, not a  
retentive or constructive one.  
  
  Just as musical materials should be thought of as  
germinal and not substantive, so our understanding of form in  
music must be transformed along similar lines.  When musical form  
is considered perceptually, it undergoes a metamorphosis from the  
structure within which figures or themes are placed and developed  
into the processive shape of auditory experience.  A musical form  
is not a container within which sounds are situated or a  
framework within which they are arranged.  Form in music, and  
indeed in the other arts as well, is rather the order of  
experience, and in this art it becomes the perceived succession  
of sounds as they are grouped, identified, and shaped  
sequentially.  Thus musical form is at most a guide to the  
sequence of musical ideas as they are heard.  It is least of all  
an abstraction from that sequence and therefore dissociated and  
different from musical experience itself.    
  
Cadences offer a clear illustration of how a formal  
feature can function directly in auditory perception.  Signifying  
formal divisions in a musical work, cadences are the notes or  
chords that conclude a musical phrase, a section of a piece, or  
an entire work, and they impose some kind of closure, momentary  
or complete.  Some cadential patterns have been studied and  
classified according to their place in the modal or diatonic  
system in which they appear.  Thus it is common to think of  
cadences as formulas to be brought out and employed at the  
appropriate divisions in a work and thus to help define its  
structure.  While this way of describing them reflects familiar  
and convenient usage, it says nothing about how cadences actually  
function, about the quality of completeness, definiteness,  
indecisiveness, or elusiveness of the endings they articulate.   
More than with most terms that designate formal features, the  
terminology used in classifying the harmonic formulas of cadences  
that were prevalent during the eighteenth and nineteenth  
centuries does, in fact, offer some descriptive suggestion of  
their auditory function, as in the case of perfect or full,  
imperfect, deceptive, and half-cadences.  Other terms, such as  
authentic and plagal cadences, do not.  Yet what really counts  
for a description of how cadences function are not the chord  
progressions or structures that distinguish one kind of cadence  
from another for taxonomic purposes but how these are actually  
heard, the quality and strength of closure they convey.  A  
composer's choice of a cadential pattern is guided, then, by the  
feel and force of the movement he is shaping and by his  
perception of the demands of the musical materials.  How much is  
the movement of the music to be slowed down or arrested?  What  
sense of completeness or incompleteness does the music require at  
that moment?  What sort of cadential arrangement will hold just  
the right degree of closure for that point in a work?  When is it  
right that a piece end and what will give that ending the proper  
weight to balance the music that preceded the final cadence?   
These are the kinds of considerations that function here in  
forming a musical experience.  Rather than choosing a cadence  
from a stock of formulas, the composer is sensitive to the  
demands of the music and is guided by its needs.       
  
What is true of cadences applies equally to a common  
internal structural feature of tonal music--modulation or the  
transition from one tonal center to another.  Modulation is  
typically analyzed according to harmonic formulas that clearly  
establish a new key, and yet nowhere is a composer's skill more  
apparent than in his ability to effect these transitions.  When  
produced by formula, we get the clumsy announcement that such a  
change is now taking place, as in the embarrassingly awkward  
modulatory interludes that Schubert often resorts to.  It is as  
if he were saying, in effect, "Wait a moment while I modulate.   
Then the music can continue on its melodic course."  In contrast,  
the skillful modulations that occur in Mozart, Chopin, or Brahms  
seem the natural outgrowth of the musical movement as it seeks  
fresh tonal surroundings and eventually returns to its original  
place.  Instead of a formula, modulation becomes the discovery of  
fresh tonal regions.  
  
The larger divisions of musical form can be understood in  
much the same way as cadences and modulations.  Standard forms of  
the classical and romantic periods may be treated either as  
structures or as experiential patterns.  The ternary or  
three-part song form, for example, embodies the basic idea of  
alternation in which a middle section offers a change in  
character from the similar sections which flank it.  This is  
usually represented structurally as ABA form, but it is heard as  
the experience of familiarity and contrast.  The same opposing  
accounts can be given the sonata-allegro form, a different, more  
complex and elaborate three-part order and the typical  
identifying structure of the first movement of the sonata,  
symphony, and concerto during the late eighteenth and nineteenth  
centuries.  Yet in a similar fashion, the thematic contrast that  
is presented in the exposition, the elaboration and working out  
of those ideas that takes place in the development, and the  
return of the original ideas that signifies the recapitulation  
can be understood either as a complex framework for the ordering  
of thematic materials or it can be heard as a pattern of musical  
unfolding.  Other standard forms of the period lend themselves to  
the same kind of interpretation:  the rondo with its constant  
alternation of new thematic ideas with the original one, the  
variation with its succession of modified restatements of the  
initial theme, the scherzo with its transfiguration into  
lightness of the character and even the formal pattern of the  
minuet.  These too may stand either as formal structures or as  
successions of qualitative experience.  Perhaps the fugue, a  
Baroque form that has continued to attract composers, illustrates  
best the insufficiency of the formula.  Even though the fugue  
commonly begins with an expository introduction of the fugal  
subject in the various voices in an established order of pitch  
relationships, there is a good deal of flexibility in what  
follows, and the composer's sensitivity to the musical  
implications of the subject is mainly what determines the  
remainder of the piece.  There are techniques and devices that  
lie at his disposal, to be sure, but here as in other musical  
forms, it is the sounds that guide the choices, not the choices  
the sounds.   
  
What is at the heart of an experiential interpretation of  
musical form, however, is the operation of memory.  For while  
sounds occupy a transitory and elusive moment, music is far more  
than the relentless passage of auditory instants.  There is a  
relatedness and cohesion to musical sounds.  Indeed, my entire  
account rests on the recognition of this but, far more important,  
so does the very possibility of music itself, certainly in the  
western classical tradition and probably beyond it as well.  It  
is the capacity for aural memory that permits musical continuity  
and shape to appear and that allows the possibility of  
repetition.  Moreover, we can grasp the experience of form  
only by means of memory, whether form be analyzed as an abstract  
structure or construed as an integral experience.  Memory is the  
experiential dimension of musical form.  
  
The subject of memory is, to be sure, a major one in  
philosophy and it can barely be mentioned here.  What we can  
observe at least for our purposes, however, is that the function  
of memory in musical experience is rather unlike its use in other  
places.  Music does not require factual recollection or what  
might be called durable memory.  Memory here is rather a  
consciousness of the immediate auditory past, a consciousness  
that extends as a projection from that reservoir into the future.   
Music functions within a mnemonic aura, so to speak, an aura of  
past and prescience.  Musical sounds resonate for a while in  
imaginative perception and carry at the same time an anticipation  
of sounds to come.  There is, then, in this art as in others a  
phosphorescence of perception, and its glow extends to enclose  
the musical work and become the form of its experience.  
  
This experiential rendering of musical form is a  
transformation that reflects the compositional process, not its  
methods.  What is significant here are not the techniques of  
individual composers but rather the aesthetic significance of the  
process through which music comes into being.  It is immaterial  
here whether a composer works laboriously at the development of  
his ideas, as Beethoven did, or whether the music issues easily,  
perhaps fully formed, as the uniquely gifted Mozart wrote.  Nor  
does it matter whether a composer uses the piano or another  
instrument for assistance or writes in silence at a desk.  There  
are biographical differences that are expressed in differences of  
techniques and working habits.  But what is common to all  
composers, whatever their individual methods may be, is the  
process of fashioning an experience of the movement of sound in  
time and in space.  
  
Musical improvisation presents an interesting test of  
this idea.  At first glance it might seem as if improvisation  
were a spontaneous welling forth of music governed only by the  
impulse of the performer at the passing instant, as seems to be  
the case in the sometimes Dionysian frenzy of jazz or rock  
improvisation.  On the other hand, some small knowledge of  
improvisational practice suggests a contrary idea in which most  
improvisation takes place within sharply defined boundaries of  
phrase and harmony, so that little is left to the performer's  
discretion but melodic turns and harmonic voicing, as in Baroque  
and Rococo ornamentation, the realization of a figured bass, the  
cadenza in a classical concerto, or jamming a chorus in a jazz  
performance.    
  
Cavell offers a view that appears to reconcile both  
alternatives when he notes that, especially up to the time of  
Beethoven, much music sounds as if it were being improvised, yet  
this takes place in a context in which the conventions of music  
are understood so well that we always know where we are and where we are  
going.  Thus the sense of spontaneity combines with the  
security of a familiar order.  With the disappearance of  
conventions we have lost such meanings in arbitrariness or have  
resorted to the nihilism of total organization.@foot[Stanley  
Cavell, "Music Discomposed," in  
(Art, Mind, and Religion), William H. Capitan and D.D.  
Merrill, eds. (Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press,  
1967), p. 86-88.]   Sparshott, on the other hand, touches on the  
topic of improvisation in pursuing the difference between a score  
and a performance by contrasting composition with improvisation.   
A score is associated with a completed composition while a  
performance conveys the quality of improvisation.@foot[(Op.  
cit.), p. 56.]  Yet both philosophers identify improvisation with  
a sense of spontaneity and growth, with the quality of freshness  
that comes with direct creation.            
  
While improvisation may take on different degrees of  
freedom in musical practice, it captures something of the dynamic  
character of the perception of music that I have been attempting   
to locate.  In itself, actual improvisation is hardly the pure  
case of free creation in music.  On one side, it is confined too  
much by conventions and formulas; on the other, improvisation is  
often too rapid to realize the nuances and to choose most truly  
from among the different dynamic forces that are present at any  
point in the unfolding of a work.  Its freshness lies in the  
constant possibility of a chance arrival at an unpremeditated  
chordal structure or turn of phrase, where the hand leads the  
ear, not the ear the hand.@foot{David Sudnow develops this at  
length in connection with jazz improvisation in [Ways of the  
Hand] (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard, 1978).}  Improvisation, then,  
reflects the generative characteristics of a given material and  
offers a first approximation of where it might go.  But there is  
something more.  It conveys the impression of a freely unfolding  
progression of musical ideas, an impression that touches the life  
that lies at the heart of musical experience.  Yet improvisation  
offers the feeling of freshness more than the fact of it, for  
while the sounds may in fact not be newly contrived, they have  
the sense of spontaneity, of spontaneous generation, as it were.  
In this respect improvisation embodies the creative quality  
central to the experience of music, a quality that is the measure  
of every performance.  Elliott Carter grasps this point  
precisely:  "From a purely musical point of view, I've always had  
the impression of improvisation of the most rewarding kind when  
good performers take the trouble to play music that is carefully  
written out as if they were thinking it up themselves while they  
played it--that is, when with much thought and practice they come  
to feel the carefully written-out piece as part of themselves and  
of their own experience, which they are communicating to others  
directly from themselves in the moment of the performance, in an  
alive way."@foot[Allen Edwards,  
(Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds; A Conversation with Elliott  
Carter), (New York:  Norton, 1972).]   
  
Yet it is not the composer and the performer, alone, who  
work toward realizing the creative forces in musical sounds.  As  
the trait central to the experience of music, the generative  
sense of musical development is found no less equally in the act  
of appreciation.  In contrasting live performances with  
recordings, Sparshott argues that there is here "the simple  
knowledge of compresence with the artist:  something real is  
happening among people."  He observes that music in which  
expressive or active elements predominate invites participation   
and that probably most music does so, thus becoming a celebration  
of community. @foot[(Op. cit.), pp. 65, 31.]  This is surely  
so, but it is because all listening--active, engaged  
listening--shares this quality of live performance.  In  
appreciative engagement no less than in creative activity, music  
is brought into being for, as William James noted, every  
perceptual experience is, as such, original.  Thus participation  
in the dynamic character of musical experience is equally the  
core of the creative act and the central trait of the re-creative  
acts of the appreciative listener as well as of the performer.  
The engaged listener follows the direction that the composer  
perhaps laboriously shaped.  He regenerates the music by  
responding to the same internal forces that guided the composer  
originally and so pursues the same process along the same path.   
"You are the music while the music lasts," wrote T.S. Eliot in  
(Four Quartets), and when this happens there is no qualitative  
difference between the composer and the listener, only an  
historical one.  
  
Much has been suggested in this broad tracing out of the  
notion of the generative character of musical creation.  Yet the  
very scope of the idea exhibits its strength and leads, as we  
have seen, to a metamorphosis of our conventional understanding  
of the features of music.  Repetition now becomes regeneration,  
not duplication.  Cadences are seen as pauses of different  
qualities in the dynamic course of musical movement.  Modulation  
is not a formula imposed to meet certain formal stipulations but  
is recast into a movement of transition toward a fresh tonal  
region.  Improvisation touches the unfolding dynamic life of  
musical ideas, while memory now means an aura of persisting  
awareness that surrounds moving sound.  Form and matter are  
transmuted into the shaping of tonal experiences out of the  
dynamic forces implicit in musical ideas.  And as a key to  
understanding how it is to write music, the concept of musical  
generation at the same time unlocks certain puzzles about its  
performance and appreciation.  Here is evidence, then, for the  
fecundity of the idea, for art has no separate parts and  
continuity among the different aspects of music reflects a kind  
of mutual clarification.  The original creation of musical  
objects and their re-creation in performance and in appreciation  
thus join as experiences of the generation and fulfillment of  
musical ideas.  
  
This essay on musical creation began with a biological  
metaphor, one that rejected Baudelaire's love lyric of decay in  
favor of an image of growth.  While this is an apt image for all  
the arts, it especially suits music.  More than in the other  
arts, the sensory directness of musical experience requires no  
intermediary of knowledge or recognition.  And the immediacy of  
the musical event reflects the directness of growth in which  
internal forces press forward to realize the potentialities that  
are inherent in the materials at hand.  Growth can be guided, to  
be sure, but it is most successful when it works, in art as in  
biology, by fulfilling the possibilities that lie in the  
materials themselves and not by imposing external demands.  The  
positive side of musical de-composition lies, then, in musical  
generation, for freeing music from misleading models can help  
encourage an equal flowering of its creation and its  
appreciation.  
  
[This essay has benefitted greatly from the careful and sensitive  
reading of Professor Geoffrey Payzant and I wish to acknowledge  
my special indebtedness to him.  Professors William Deguire, Gary  
Washington, Robert Cantrick, and Morris Grossman have all given  
me the benefit of their knowledge and advice and for that I am  
most grateful.]  
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Add when developing appreciative re-experience of the generative  
process:  Stravinsky:  "the listener reacts and becomes a partner  
in the game initiated by the creator."  "this exceptional  
participation gives the partner such lively pleasure that it  
unites him in  a certain measure with the mind that conceived and  
realized the work to which he is listening, giving him the  
illusion of identifying himself with the creator.  That is the  
meaning of Raphael's famous adage:  'to understand is to equal'."  [81]   
  
  Perhaps that is what Raphael meant by his famous  
observation, "To understand is to equal."  (Quoted by Stravinsky, etc.)  
 
 
